Fordham Law School

FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History
Congressional Materials

Twenty-Fifth Amendment Archive

3-24-1965

Report on Presidential Inability and Vacancies in
the Office of the Vice President, House of
Representatives Report No. 89-203
Committee on the Judiciary. House of Representatives. United States.

Follow this and additional works at: http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/
twentyfifth_amendment_congressional_materials
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Committee on the Judiciary. House of Representatives. United States., "Report on Presidential Inability and Vacancies in the Office of
the Vice President, House of Representatives Report No. 89-203" (1965). Congressional Materials. 14.
http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/twentyfifth_amendment_congressional_materials/14

This Book is brought to you for free and open access by the Twenty-Fifth Amendment Archive at FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship
and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Congressional Materials by an authorized administrator of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of
Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

}

89TH CONGRESS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
J
1st Session

ABILITYY AND VACANCIES
PRESTI)ENTIAL,
OFFICE OF THE V[(CE PRESIDENT

REPORT

No. 203

IN THEI

MARICH 24, 1965.---Referred to the llouse (Calendar and ordere(l to be

pIrinted

Mr. MNcCuilrocil, from the Committee on the Judiciary, submitted
the following

REPORT
(To accompany II.J. Res. 1l

The Committee on the Judiciary, to wthoml was referred the joint
resolution (H.J. Res. 1) proposing an amendment to the Constitution
of the United States relating to succession to the Presidency and
Vice-Presidency and to cases where the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, having considered the same,
report favorably thereon with an amendment and recommend that
the joint resolution do pass.
The amendment is as follows:
Strike all after the enacting clause and insert in lieu thereof the

following:

That the following article is proposed as an amendment to the Constitution
of the United States, which shall be valid to all intents and purposes as part of
the Constitution when, ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several
States within seven' years from the date of its submission by the Congress:

"Article"SECTION 1. In case of the removal of the President from office or of his death
or resignation the Vice President shall become President.
"SEC. 2. Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of the Vice President, the
President shall nominate a Vice President who shall take office upon confirmation
a majority vote of both Houses of Congress.
by"SEC.
3. Whenever the President transmits to the President pro tempore of
the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that he ib unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, arid until
he transmits a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall
be discharged by the Vice President as Acting President.
"SEC. 4. Whenever the Vice President and a majority of the principal officers
of the executive departments, or such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit to the PIresident pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of
the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice President shall
immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting President.
36-008-.--1
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"Thereafter, When the President transmits to the, President pro tempore of
'the Senate and the Speaker of the Iouse of Representative his written
declaration that no inability exists, he shall resume tle powers and duties of his office
unless the Vice President and a majority of the principal officers of tile executive
or such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit within
departments,
two clays to the President pro tempore of tile Senate and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable
to discharge the powers and duties of his office. Thereupon Congress shall decide
the issue, immediately assembling for that purpose if not in session. If the Congress, within ten days after the receipt of the written declaration of the Vice
President and a majority of the principalfgfli¢ of, t^.e ey4tlv.y departments,
or such other body as Congress mayl by law provide, determines by two-thirds
vote of both Iouses that the President is unable to discharge the powers and
duties of the office, thle Vice Iresident shall continue to discharge the same as
Acting President; otherwise the lPresident shall resume the powers and duties
of his office."
PURPOSE OF TIIE AMENDMENT

of the amendment is to distinguish between
principal purpose
declared
by the President himself and inability
inability voluntarily
declared without hls consent. In the former case, tle President can
resume his dutties by making a simple declaration that the inability has
ceased; in the latter, the measure provides procedures for )promptly
determining the presence or absence of inability when that issue is

Thle

present.

The amendment makes no changes in sections 1 and 2 of the constitutional amendment proposed by Iouse Joint Resolution 1 as introin sections 3 and 4 and it eliminates
(duced; it does make changes
the
section 5 by merging
substance of that section with tliat of
section 4.
The changes made by the amendment in section 3 clarify the
when the President himself
procedurehisand clarifytothe consequences
the
declares
inability discharge powers and duties of his office.
'I'here are two: First, the amendment indicates tihe officials to whom
the President's written declaration of inability shall be transmiitted,
the President pro temnpore of the Senate and the Speaker
namely
of the Iouse of Representatives. The committee deemed it desirable
to add this specification which was absent from the joint resolution as
introduced. Second, the amendment makes clear that, in case of
such voluntary self-disqualification by tlhe President, the Presiden t's
transmittal to the same officials of a written declaration
subsequent
to the contrary, i.e., a written declaration that no inability exists,
terminates the Vice President's exercise of the Presidential powers
and (duties, and that the President shall thereupon resume them.
Jn short, it is the intent of the committee that voluntary self-disby the President shall be terminated byfthi President's
qualification
own declaration that no inability exists, without further ado. To
the Vice President and the Cabinet to challenge such an
permit
assertion of recovery might discourage a President fronl voluntarily
in case of Illness. The right of challenge
relinquishing his powers
cases
in which the Vice President and Cabinet,
for
would be reserved
without the President's consent, had found him unable to discharge
his powers and duties.
Sections 4 and 5 of the amendment proposed by House Joint Resolution 1, as introduced, dealt respectively with thle devolution upon
thle Vice President, as Acting President, of the President's powers and
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duties pursuant to a declaration of his inability made by the Vice
President and other officials, and with the procedure upon subsequent
declaration by the President' that no inability exists.
The amendment places the substance of former section 5 into section
4, in order to emphasize the committee's intent that the procedure
section 5 relates only to cases in which Presidential
by former
provided
has
been
declared
inability
by others than the President. Two identical changes are made in former sections 4 and 5. First, the term
"priifcipal dffice~rs of the'executive departments" is substituted for the
term "heads of the executive departments" to make it clearer that only
officials of Cabinet rank should participate in the decision as to whether
presidential inability exists. Tile substituted language follows more
closely article II, section 2, of the Constitution, which provides that
the President may require the opinion in light "of the principal officers
in each of the executive departments * * *." The intent of the committee is that the Presidential appointees who direct the 10 executive
named in 5 U.S.C. 1, or any executive department esdepartments
tablished in the future, generally considered to comprise the President's Cabinet, would participate, with the Vice President, in determining inability. In case of the death, resignation, absence, or sickness of the head of any executive department, the acting head of the
would be authorized to participate in a presidential
department
determination.
inability
iThe second change made in former sections 4 and 5 is to specify
the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House
of Representatives as the congressional officials to whom declaration
concerning Presidential inability shall be transmitted, as is done in
section 3.
The language of former section 5 of House Joint Resolution 1 is
further amended to make clear that if Congress is not in session at
the time of receipt by the President pro tempore of the Senate and
the Speaker of the House of Representatives of a written declaration
the Vice President and a majority of the principal officers of the
by
executive departments contradicting a Presidential declaration that
no inability exists, Congress shall immediately assemble for the purpose of deciding the issue. Finally, the language of former section 5
is further amended by providing that in such event the President shall
resume the powers and duties of his office unless the Congress within
10 days after receipt of such declaration of Presidential inability dedetermines by two-thirds vote of both Houses that the President is in
fact unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office.
deems it essential in the interest of stability of
'The committee
to the smallest possible period the time during
to
limit
government
which the vital issue of the executive power can remain in doubt.
Under the bill, following a Presidential declaration that the disability
previously declared by others no longer exists, a challenge to such
declaration must be made within 2 days of its receipt by the heads of
the Housed of Congress and must be finally determined within the
following 10 days. Otherwise the President, having declared himself
and duties. An unlimited power in
able, will resume his powers
an
irresistible
afford
might
temptation to temporize
Congress
with respect to restoring the President's powers. In this highly
charged area there is no room for equivocation or delay.
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For its report herein the committee adopts in substantial measure
the report of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary to accompany
Senate Joint Resolution 1, namely, Senate Report No. 66, 89th Congress, 1st session:
The constitutional provisions
'The Constitution of the United States, in article II, section 1,
clause 5, contains provisions relating to the continuity of the Executive
power at times of death, resignation, inability, or removal of a President. No replacement provision is made in the Constitution where a
vacancy occurs in the office of the Vice President. Article II, section
1, clause 5, reads as follows:
In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or
at his Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the
Powers and Duties of the said Office, the same shall devolve
on the Vice President, and the Congress may by Law provide
for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation, or Inability,
both of the President and 'Vice President, declaring what
Officer shall then act as President, and such Officer shall act
accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a President
shall be elected.
This is the language of the Constitution as it was adopted by the
Constitutional Convention upon recommendation of the Committee
on Style. When this portion of the Constitution was submitted to
that Committee it read as follows:
In case of his (the President's) removal as aforesaid,
or inability to discharge the
death, absence, resignation,
of duties of his office, the Vice President shall exerpowers
cise those powers and duties until another President be
chosen, or until the inability of the President be removed.
The Legislature may declare by law what officer of the
United States shall act as President, in case of the death,
or disability of the President and Vice President;
resignation,
and such officer shall act accordingly, until such disability
be removed, or a President shall be elected.
While the Committee on Style was given no authority to change
the substance of prior determinations of the Convention, it is clear
that this portion of the draft which that Committee ultimately
submitted was a considerable alteration of the proposal which tho
Committee had received.
The inability clause and the Tyler precedent
The records of the Constitutional Convention do not contain any
interpretation of the provisions as they relate to inability.
explicit
As a matter of fact, the records of the Convention contain only one
this clause which deal with the
apparent reference to the aspects of
question of disability. It was Mr. John Dickinson, of Delaware, who,

on

August 27, 1787, asked:

What is the extent of the term "disability" and who is to be
judge of it? (Farrand, "Records of the Constitutional
Convention of 1787," vol. 2, p. 427.)
the
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The question is not answered so farl as the records of the Convention
disclose.
It was not until 1841 that this clause of the Constitution was called
into question by the occurrence of one of the listed contingencies.
In that year President William Henry Harrison died, and Vice President John Tyler faced the determination as to whether, under this
provision of the Constitution, he must serve as Acting President or
whether he became the Prosident of the United States. Vice President
Tyler gave ainwer by taking the oath as President of the United States.
While this evoked some protest at the time, noticeably that of Senator
William Allen, of Ohio, tle Vice President (Tyler) was later recognized
President of the United States (ConCongress as 1st
by both Houses of27th
Globe,
sess., vol. 10, pp. 3-5, May 31gressional
Cong.,
June 1, 1841).
This.precedent of John Tyler has since been confirmed on seven
occasions when Vice Presidents .have succeeded to the Presidency of
the United States by virtue of the death of the incumbent President.
Vice Presidents Fillmore, Johnson, Arthur, Theodore Roosevelt,
Coolidge,
Truman, and Lyndon Johnson all became President in this
manner.
The acts of these Vice Presidents, and the acquiescence in, or
confirmation of, their acts by Congress have served to establish a
precedent that, in one of the contingencies under article II, section 1,
clause 5, that of death, the Vice President becomes President of the
United States.
The clause which provides for succession in case of death also
in case of resignation, removal from office, or
applies to succession
In all four contingencies, the Constitution states: "the
inability.
same shall devolve on the Vice President."
Thus it is said that whatever devolves upon the Vice President
upon death of the President, likewise devolves upon him by reason of
the resignation, inability, or removal from office of the President.
(Theodore Dwight, "Presidential Inability," North American Review,
vol. 133, p. 442 (1919).)
The Tyler precedent, therefore has served to cause doubt on the
of an incapacitated Presi(ent to resume the functions of his
ability
office upon recovery. Professor Dwight; who letter became president
of Yale University, found further basis for this argument in the fact
that the Constitution, while causing either the office, or thie power and
duties of the office, to "devolve" upon the Vice President, is silent on
the return of the office or its functions to the President upon recovery.
Where both the President and Vice President are incapable of serving,
the Constitution grants Congress the power to declare what officer
shall act as President "until the disability is removed."
These considerations apparently moved persons such as Daniel
Webster, who was Secretary of State when Tyler took office as President, to declare that t0te powers of the office are inseparable from the
office itself and that a recovered President could not displace a Vice
President who had assumed. the prerogatives of the Presidency. This
interpretation gains support by implication from the language of
article I, section 3, clause 5, of the Constitution which provides that:
The Senate shall chuse their other Officers, and also a
President pro tempore, ini the absence of the Vice President,
or when he shall exercise the office of President of the United
States. [Italic supplied.]
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Thle doubt engendered by precedent was so strong that on two
occasions in the history of the United States it has contributed nlaterially to the failure of Vice Presidents to assume the office of President at
a time when it President was disabled. 'The first of these occasions
arose in 1881 when P'resident Garfield fell victim of an assassin's
bullet. President (Garfield lingered for some 80 days during which he
but one official act, the signing of al extradition paper.
performed
'lere is little doubt but that there wore pressing issues before tile
executive departmentt at that time which required the attention of a
Chief Executive. (omnmissiols were to be issued to officers of the
United States. The foreign relations of this Nation required attention.
There was evidence of mail frauds involving officials of the Federal
Government. Yet only such business as could be (lis)osed of by the
heads of Government departments, without Presidential supervision,
was handled. Vice President Arthur did not act. Respected legal
opinion of the day was divided upon the ability of the President to
resume the duties of his office should he recover. (See opinions of
Lyman Trlumbull, Judgge Thomas Cooley, Benjamin Butler, and Prof.
Theodore Dwight, "Presidential Inability, North American Review,"
vol. 133, 1)1p. 417-446 (1881).)
The division of legal authority on this question apparently extended
to the Cabinet, for newspapers of that (lay, notably the New York
the New York Tribune, and the New York Times contain
Herald,
accounts stating that the Cabinet considered the question of tile
of the Vice President acting during the period of the
advisability
President's incapacity. Four of the seven Ca(binet members were
said to be of tlio opinion that there could 1)e n11 te1111)orary (evolution
of Presidential power on thei Vice President. This groul) reportedly
included tlhe then Attorney General of the United States, Mr. Wayne
vlacVeagh. All of Garfield's Cabinet were of the view that it would

to act but since tlhey could not
(lesiral)lo for the ViceofPresident
President
to resume his office upon
agree upon tile abilitythe President's
tile
condition
and
because
prevented them from
recovery, the issue to directly tlhe matter was
dropped.
presenting
himl
It was not until President Woodrow Wilson suffered a severe stroke
in 1919 that the matter became one of pressing Urgency again. Tiis
damage to President Wilson's health came at a time \when the struggle
concerning the position of the United States in the League of Nations
was at its height. Major matters of foreign policy such as tlhe Shantung Settlement were unresolved. 'rie British Ambassador spent
4 months in Washington without being received by tle President.
became law without the President's
Twerity-eight acts of Congress"Pi'esidential
the Review,"
Inability,
signature (Lindsay Rogers,
in
before
Senate
Subcommittee
1958
hearings
May 8, 1920; reprinted
on Constitutional Amendnmenits, pp. 232-235). The President's
associates acted as a

be

wife and a group of White House
screening
board on decisions which could be submitted to the President without
Wilson, "My Memoirs,'
Bolling
impatiriment of his health. (See EdithYeats
in the White House," ppi
pp. 288-290; Hoover, "Folrty-to
105-106; Tumnulty, "Woodrow Wilson as I Know Him," ofpp. 437-138.)
As in 1881, the Cabinet considered tile advisability asking the
Vice President to act as President. This time, there was considerable
to the adoption of such procedure on the part of assistants
opposition
to the President. It has been reported by a Presidential secretary
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of that (lay that ho reproached the Secretary of State for suggesting,
such a possibility (Joseph P'. Tumulty, "Woodrow Wilson as I Know
Him," pp. 443-444). Upon tile Presilent's ultimate recovery, the
President caused the displacementt of the Secretary of State for
reasons of alleged isldoyalty to the President (Tulmulty, "Woo(drow.
Wilson as I Know Him," pp. 444-445).
On three occasions during the Eisenhower administration, incidents
the physical health of the Pre'sident served to focus attention
involving
on the inability clause.
President Eisenhower became concerned aiboult the gap in the
Constitution relative to Presidential inability, and ho attempted to
reduce the hazards by means of tan informal agreement with Vice
President Nixon. The agreement provided:
1. In the event of inability the President woull, if possible,
so inform the Vice President, and the Vice President would servo
as Acting President, exercising tlh powers and duties of the.
office until the inability had ended.
2. In tile event of an inability which would prevent the
President from so communicating with the Vice President, the
Vice President, after such consultation as seems to him appro-.
priate. ulider the circumstances, would decide upon the devolution of the powers and dutiess of the office and would serve as
Acting President until the inability had ended.
3. The President, in either event, would ldtermine when the
had en(led and at that time would resume the full
inaiiility
exercise of the powers and duties of the office.
President Kennedy entered into a similar agreement with Vice
as did President Johnson witl Speaker John
President Johnson
McCormaclk and Vice President Iubert Huml)hrey. Such informal
agrCeemlents cannot I)e considered an adequate solution to the problem
l)ecause: (A) Their operation would differ according to the relationship between the particular holders of the offices; (13) a private
Presidenlt clear authority to disagreement cannot give theonVice
the Presidentlby tlie Constitution,
confer'red
charge powers
treaties, or statutes; (C) no provision is ltmalde for tlie situation in
which t dispute exists over whether or not the President is disabled.
Former Attorneys General Brownell and Rogers as well as Attormey.
General Kennedy agree that the only definitive Iethod to settle lthe
problems is by means of a constitutional amendment.
THE

NEED

FOI CHANGE

The historical review of the interpretation of article II, section 1,
clause 5, suggests the difficulties which it has already presented.
The language of the clause is unclear, its application uncertain. The.
clause couples the contingencies of a permalllnent nature sucht as death,
or removal from office, with inability, a contingency
resignation,
be
which mllay temporary. It does not clearly commit tlhe determination of inability to any individual or group, nor (loes it define
so that tile existence of such at status Imay be open al(d
inability
notorious. It leaves uncertain the capacity ill wVhich tile Vice President acts during a period of inability of the Presildent. It fails to
define the period during which the Vice Presildent serves.. It does
not specify that a recovered Presidenlt maly regain the prerogatives
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of his office if he has relinquished them. It fails to provide any
mechanism for determining whether a President has in fact recovered
from his inability, nor does it indicate how a President, who sought to
recover his prerogatives while still disabled, might be prevented from
so.
doing
The resolution of these issues is imperative if continuity of Executive power is to be preserved with a minimum of turbulence at tines
when a President is disabled. Contiinuity of Execuitive authority is
more important tocdty than ever before. The concern which has been
manifested on previous occasions when a President was disabled, is
increased when the disability problem is weighed in the light of the
increased importance of the Office of the Presidency to the United
States and to the world.
This increased concern has in turn manifested an intensified examination of the adequacy of the provisions relating to the orderly transfer
of the functions of the Presidency. Such an examination is not
reassuring. The constitutional provision has not been utilized because
its
have not. been clear. After 176 years of experience
with the Constitution the inability clause remains an untested pro
vision of uncertain application.

proceldulres

METHOD OF CHANGE

In previous instances in history when this question has arisen, one
of tile major considerations has been whether Congress could constitutiionally proceed to resolve the problem by statute, or whether
an enabling constitutional amendment would be necessary. As early
as 1920, when the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, 66th Congress, 2d session, considered the problem,
Representatives Madden, Rogers, and McArthur took the position
that the matter of disability could be dealt with by statute without
an amendment to the Constitution, whereas Representative Fess
was of the opinion that Congress was not authorized to act under the
and that an .amendment would first have to be adopted
Constitution,
before
the Committee on tlheJudiciary, House of Rep(hearings
Febrpary 26 and March 1, 1920). Through the years,
resentatives,
this controversy has increased in intensity among Congressmen and
constitutional scholars who have considered the Presidential inability

problem.
Those who feel hlat Congress does not have the authority to resolve
the matter by statute claim that the Constitution does not support a
reasonable inference that Congress is empowered to legislate. They
out that article II, section 1,.clause 5, of the Constitution authorpoint
ized Congress to provide by statute for the case where both the President. and Vice President are incapable of serving. By implication
Congress does not have the authority to legislate with regard to the
situation which concerns only a disabled President, with the Vice
President succeeding to his powers and duties. Apparently this is
the proper construction, because the first statute dealing with Presidential succession under article II, section 1, clause 6, which was
enacted by contemporaries of the framers of the Constitutionl did
not purport to establish succession in instances where the President
1 Stat.
alone was disabled
of March
(act

1, 1792,

239).
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Serious doubts have also been raised as to whether the "necessary
authority of article I, section 8, clause 18 gives the
proper"
the power to legislate in this situation. The Constitution
Congress
does not vest any department or office with tlie power to determine
inability, or to decide the term during which the Vice President shall
act, or to determine whether'and at what time the President inay later
his prerogatives upon recovery. Thus it is difficult to argue
regain
that article I, section 8, clause 18, gives the Congress the authority
to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying out
such powers.
In recent years, there seeins to have been a strong shift of opinion
in favor of the proposition that a constitutional amendment' is necessary, and that a mere statute would not be adequate to solve the
problem. The last three Attorneys General who have testified on the
matter, Herbert Brownell, William P. Rogers, and Acting Attorney
General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, have agreed an amendment is
In addition to the American Bar Association and' the
necessary.
American Association of Law Schools, the following organizations
an amendment is necessary: the State bar associations
have'agreed
of Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana,
Michigan, Ohio, Rhode Island,
and the bar associations of Denver, Colo.;
Virginia,
Texas,
Vermont;
the District of Columbia; Dade County, Fla.; city of New York;
Passaic County, N.J.; Greensboro, N.C.; York County, Pa.; and
Wis.
MilWaukee,
The most persuasive argument in favor of aniending the Constitution
is that so many legal questions have been raised about the authority
of Congress to act on this subject without an amendinent that any
statute on the subject would be open to criticism and challenge at
the most critical time-that is, either when a President had become
disabled, or when a President sought to recover his office. Under
these circumstances, there is an urgent, need to adopt an amendment
which would distinctly enumerate the proceedings for determination
of the conmencement and termination of disability.
Filling of vacancies in the office of the President
While the records of the Constitutional Convention disclosed
little insight on the framers' interpretation of the inability provisions
of the Constitution, they do reveal that wide disagreement prevailed
whether or not a Vice President was needed. If he was
concerning
what
were to be his official duties, if any.
needed,
The creation of thie office of Vice President came in the closing
of the Constitutional Convention. Although such a position
days
was considered very early in the Convention.later proposals envisaged
the President of the Senate, the Chief Justice, and even a council of
advisers, as persons who would direct the executive branch should a
of Executive authority come to pass.
lapse
On Septefiber 4, 1787, a Committee of Eleven, selected to deliberate
those portions of the Constitution which had been postponed, recommended that an office of Vice President be created and that he be
elected with the President by an electoral college. On September 7,
1787, the Convention discussed the Vice-Presidency and the duties to
be performed by the occupant of the Office. Although much deliberation ensued regarding the official functions of the office, little
and

H.
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thought seems to have been given to the succession of the Vice President to the office of President in case of the death of the President.
A committee, designated to revise the style of and arrange the
articles agreed to by the House, returned to Convention on September
12, 1787, a draft which for all practical purposes was to become the
Constitution of the United States. It contemplated two official
duties for the Vice President: (1) to preside over the Senate, in which
he would vote when the Senate was "equally divided" and
capacity
the
of the presidential electors, and
listing the votes
opento certificates
duties of the President in case of his
(2) discharge the powers and
death, resignation,
removal, or inability.
While the Constitltion does not address itself in all cases to specifics
President as was the case for the President, the
regarding theof Vice
the
office
in view of the Convention is made apparent
importance
section
clause
3. This clause, the original provision
article
1,
II,
by
for the election of the President and the Vice President, made it clear
that it was designed to insure that the Vice President was a person
in stature to the President.
equal
The intent of the Conveltion, however, was totally frustrated when
the electors began to distinguish between the two votes which article
II, section 1, clause- 3 had bestowed upon them. This inherent defect
was made painfully apparent in the famous Jefferson-Burr election
contest of 1800, and in 1804 the 12th amendment modified the college
to prevent a reoccurrence of siinilar circumstances.
voting
There is little doubt the 12th amendment removed a serious defect
from the Constitution. However, its passage, coupled with the

of nominating Vice Presidents to appease
growing political
practice
of
factions
the
parties, began a- decline that was in
disappointed
to mold the Vice-Presidency into an office of inferiority
ensuing
years
and disparagement.
Fortunately, this century saw a gradual resurgence of the importance
of the Vice-Presidency. He has become a regular member of the
Chairman of the National Aeronautics and Space Council,
Cabinet,
Chairman of the President's Committee on Equal Employment Opa member of the National Security Council, and a personal
portunities,
for the President. He has in the eyes of Government regained
envoy
much of the "equal stature" which the framers of the Constitution
contemplated he should entertain.
THE URGENCY OF AMENDMENT

The death of Piesideit Kennedy and the accession of Piesident
Johnson in 1963 pointed up once again tie abyss which exists in the
executive branch when there is no incumbent Vice President. Sixteen
times the United States of America has been without a Vice President,
37 years during our history.
totaling
Convention in its
As has been pointed out, the
wisdom foresaw the need to have a qualified and able occupant of the
Vice President's office should the President die. They did not,
however,
provide the mechanics whereby a Vice-Presidential vacancy
could be filled.
a determination of whether
The considerations which enter
Vice
the
office
of
President when it becomes
for
provisions
filling
vacant should be made by simple legislation or require a constitutional

Constitutionald

itito
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amendment are similar to those which enter into the same kind of
determination about Presidential inability provisions. In both cases,
there is some opinion that Congress has authority to act. However,
the arguments that an amendment is necessary are strong and supported by many individuals: We must not gamble with the constitutional legitimacy of our Nation's executive branch. When a
President or a Vice President of the United States assumes his office,
the entire Nation and the world must know without doubt that he
does so as a matter of right. Only a constitutional amendment can
the necessary air of legitimacy.
supply
IThe argument tiat Congress can designate a Vice President by law
is at best a weak one. The power of Congress in this regard is measured principally by article II, section 1, clause 6, which states that-the Congress may by law provide for the Case of Removal
Death, Resignation, or Inability, both of the President and
Vice President, declaring what officer shall then act as Presiact accordingly, until the
dent, and such officeror shall
a
shall be elected.
President
be
Disability removed,
This is not in specific terms a power to declare what officer shall be
Vice President. It is a power to declare upon what officer the duties
and powers of the office of President shall devolve when there is
neither President nor.Vice President to act. ;
To stand by ready for the powers and duties of the Presidential
office to devolve upon him at the time of death or inability of tihe
President, is the principal constitutional function of the Vice President.
It is clear that Congress can designate the officer who is to perform
that function when the office of Vice. President is vacant, Indeed
it has done so in each of the Presidential Succession Acts. Should
there be any more objection to designating tliat officer Vice President
than there is to designating as President the Vice President upon
whom devolve the powers and ditices of a deceased President, for
which designation there is no specific constitutional authorization?
The answer, to, that question is "Yes." The.Constitution has given
the Vice President another duty and sets forth specific instructions as
to who is to perform it in his absence. Article , section 2, clause 4,
provides that the Vice President shall be the President of the Senate
and clause 5 provides that the Senate shall choose its otier officers
a "Presidentl pro T'empore, in the Absince of the Vice Presiincluldilg
dent or when he shall exercise the Office Qf the President of tlie United
States." It is very difficult to argue tliat a person designated Vice
President by Congress, or selected in any way other than by the procedures outlined in amendments 12 and 22, can be the President of the
Senate.
One of the principal reasons for filling the office of Vice President
when it becomes vacant is to permit the.person next in line to become
familiar with the problems he will face should hee called upon to act
as President, e.g., to serve on the National Security Council, ead the
Presidents Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity, participate in Cabinet meetings and take part in other top-level discussions
which lead to national policymaking decisions. TI:ose who consider
a law sufficient to provide for filling a Vice Presidential vacancy point
out that the Constitution says nothing about such duties and there is
therefore nothing to prevent Congress from assigning these duties to
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designates as next in line in whatever Presidential

suc-

cessing law it enacts. Regardless of what office he held at the time of
his designation as Vice President, however,he would have a difficult
time carrying out the duties of both offices at the same time.
When, to all these weaknesses, one adds the fact that no matter
what laws Congress may write describing the duties of the officer it
to act as Vice President, the extent to which the President
designates
takes him into his confidence or shares with him the deliberations leading to executive decisions is to be determined largely by the President
rather than by statute, practical necessity would seem to require not
only that the procedure for determining who fills the Vice Presidency
when it becomes vacant be established by constitutional amendment
but that the President be given an active role in the procedure whatit be.

ever

Finally, as in the case of inability, the most persuasive argument in
favor of amending the Constitution is the division of authority colcerning the authority of Congress to act on this subject. With this
division in existence it would seem that any statute on the subject
would be open to criticism and challenge at a time when absolute
legitimacy was needed.
ANALYSIS

Inability
The proposal now being submitted is cast in the form of a constitutional amendment for the reasons which have been outlined
earlier.
Article II, section 1, clause 5, of the Constitution is unclear on two
important points. The first is whether the "office" of the President
or the "powers and duties of the said office" devolve upon the Vice
President in the event of Presidential inttbility. The second is who
has the authority to determine what inability is, when it commences,
and when it terminates. Senate Joint Resolution 1 resolves both
questions.
The first section would affirm the historical practice by which a
Vice President has become President upon the death of the President,
further extending the practice to te conti
es of resignation or
removal from office. It separates the provisions relating to inability
from those relating to death, resignation, or removal, thereby eliminating
any ambiguity in the language of the present provision in
article II, section 1, clause 5.
Sections 3 and 4 embrace tie procedures for determining the comnlencement and terminaitio of Presidential inability.
Section 3 lends constitutional authority to the practice that has
heretofore been carried out by informal agreements between the
President and the person iiext in the line of succession. It makes clear
that the President may declare in writing his disability and that upon
such an occurrence the Vice President becomes Acting President.
the title of Acting President the proposal makes clear
By establishing
the
it
is
not
"office" but the "powers and duties of the-offce"
that
that devolve on the Vice President and further clarifies the status of
the Vice President during thie period when he is discharging the
and duties of a disabled President.
powers
The amendment to section 3 makes certain that in cases in which
a President himself declares his inability, the period of his disability
would be terminated by a simple Presidential notice to both Houses
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of Congress. To permit the Vice President and Cabinet to challenge
such an assertion of recovery might discourage a President from volhis powers in case of illness. The right of chalrelinquishing
untarilywould
be
for cases in which the Vice President and
reserved
lenge
the Cabinet, without the President's consent, had found him unable
to discharge his powers and duties.
Section 4 of the proposed constitutional amendment deals with the
most difficult probleil of inability-the factual determination of
whether or not inability exists. It provides that whenever the Vice
President and a majority of the principal officers of the executive
or such other body as Congress may by law provide,
departments,
transmit to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker
of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the
President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office,
the Vice President shall immediately assume the powers and duties
of the office as Acting President.
The final success of any constitutional arrangement to secure
continuity in cases of inability must depend upon public opinion with
a posesslon of a sense of "constitutional morality." Without such
a feeling of responsibility there can be no absolute guarantee against
:No mechanical or procedural solution will provide a
usurpation.answer
if one assumes hypothetical cases in which most of
complete
the parties are rogues and in which no popular sense of constitutional
It seems necessary that an attitude be adopted that
propriety exist'.
be dealing with "reasonable men" at the
shall
we
presumes
always
level.
The combination of the judgment of the
highest governmental
Vice President and a majority of the Cabinet members appears to
furnish the most feasible formula without upsetting the fundamental
checks and balances between the executive, legislative, and judicial
branches. It would enable prompt action by the persons closest to the
President, both politically and physically, and presumably most
familiar with his condition. It is assumedthat such decision would
be made only after adequate consultation with medical experts who
were intricately familiar with the President's physical and mental
condition.
There are many distingiiihed advocates for a specially constituted
of a factfinding body to determine presidential
group in the nature
than
the
Cabinet. However, such a group would face
inability!rather
the
If
dilemmas.
President is so incapacitated that he cannot
many
declare his own inability the factual determination of inability would
be relatively simple. No need would exist for a special factfinding
Nor is a factnnding body necessary if the President can and
body.
does declare his own inability. If, however, the President and those
around him differ as to whether he does suffer from an inability which
he is unwilling: to admit, then a critical dispute exists. But this disnot be determined by a special commission composed of
pute should
the executive branch. Such a commission runs a good
outside
persons
chance of coming out with a split decision. What would be the effect,
for example,'if a commission of seven voted four to three that the President was fit and able to perform his office? What power could he
exert during the rest of his term when, by common knowledge, a
vote in the commission proceedings could yet deny him
change of tooneexercise
the powers of his office? If the vote were the
the right
other way and the Vice President were installed as Acting President,
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what powers could he exert when everyone would know that one vote
the other way could cause his summary removal from the exercise
of Presidential powers? If the man acting as President were placed
in this awkward, completely untenable and impotent position, the
effect on domestic affairs would be bad enough; the effect on the international position of the United States might well be catastrophic.
However, in the interest of providing flexibility for the future; the
amendment would authorize the Congress to designate a different body
if this were deemed desirable in light of subsequent experience,
The second paragraph of section 4 of the proposed amendment
would permit the Presidenit to resume the powers and duties of the
office upon his transmission to the President of the Senate and the
of the House of Representatives of his written declaration
Speaker
that no inability existed. However, should 'the Vice President and
a majority of the principal officers of the executive departments feel
that the President is unable, then they could prevent the President
from' resuming the powers' and duties of the' office by transmitting
their written declaration so stating to the President'of the Senate and
the Speaker of the House of Representatives within 2 days. Once
the declaration of the President stating no inability exists has been
transmitted to the President'of the Senate and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, then the issue is squarely joined. At this
the proposal recommends. that the Congress shall make, the
point
final determination on the existence of inability. If .within '10 days
the Congress determines by a two-thirds vote of botli Houses that the
President is unable, then' the Vice President continues. as Acting
President. However, should the Congress fail in any manner to cart
a vote of two-thirds or more in both Houses supporting the' position
that the President'was unable to perform the powers' and tiess o6f
his office, then the President would, resume after the expiration of
10 days the powers and dutie's of the office. The recommendation
for a vote of two-thirds is in conformity with the provision, of article I,
section 3, clause' 6, of the Constitution relating to impeachmients.
The committee contmplates that votes taken pursuanttothote'provisions of the proposed constitutional amendment will be conducted
in accordance with the rules of the House and Senate;, respectively,
and that record votes may be taken when in conformity with 'such rules.
This proposal achieves the goal of an immediate original transfer
in Executive authority and the resumption of it in consonance both
with the originallintent of the framers of the Constitution and with
the balance of powers among the three branches of our Government
which is the permanent strength of the Constitution.
Vacanites
Section 2 is intended to virtually assure us that the Nationi will
possess 'a Vice President. It would require a President to
always
nominate a person who meets the existing constitutional qualifications
.to be Vice President whenever a vacancy occurred in that office.
The nominee would take office as Vice President once 'he has been
confirmed by a majority vote in both Houses of the Congress.
In considering this section of the proposal, it was'observed' that the
office of the Vice President' has become one of the most important
The days are long past when it was largely
positions inandourof country.
little
importance, as has been previously pointed out.
honorary
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For more than a decade the Vice President has borne specific and
imnpoitant responsibilities il the executive branch of Governmenlt.
He has come to share and participate in the executive functioning of
our Government, so that in the event of tragedy there would be no
break in the informed exercise of executive authority. Never has
this been more adequately exemplified than by the uninterrupted
of the Presidency by Lyndon B. Johnson.
assumption
It is without contest that the procedure for the selection of a Vice
President must contemplate the assurance of a person who is comwith the President. Tlie importance of this compatibility
ispatible
in the modern practice of both major political parties
recognized
in according the presidential candidatesa major voice in choosing his
approval. This proposal would
running mate subject to convention
permit the President to choose his Vice President subject to congres-

sional approval. In this way the country would be assured of a Vice
President of the same political party as the President, someone who
would presumably work in harmony with the basic policies of the
President.
The committee recommends adoption of the joint resolution as
amended.
COMMITTEE AMENDMENTS TO HOUSE JOINT RESOLUTION 1 SHOWING
OMISSIONS, NEW MATTER, AND RETAINED WORDING

The committee amendments to the House joint resolution are
shown as follows: Provisions of the resolution as introduced which
are omitted are enclosed in black brackets, new matter is printed in
italic, provisions in which no change is proposed are shown in roman.
ArticleSECTION 1. In case of the removal of the President from
office or of his death or resignation, the Vice President shall
become President.
SEC. 2. Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of the
Vice President, the President shall nominate a Vice President
who shall take office upoil confirmation by a majority vote
of both Houses of Congress.
SEC 3. [If the President declares in writing] Whenever the
President transmits to the President Pro Tempore of the Senate
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written
declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and
duties of his office, and until he transmits a written declaration
to the contrary such powers and duties shall be discharged by
the Vice Presidenit as Acting President.
SEC. 4. [If the President does not so declare, and the Vice
President with the written concurrence of a majority of the
heads of the executive departments or
such other bod as
law
to
the Congress his]
transmits
may by
provide,
Congress
Whenever the Vice President and a majority of the principal
or such other body as
of the executive
departments,
officers
law
transmit
to the President Pro
may by
Congress
provide,
Tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is
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unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the
Vice President shall immediately assume the powers and
duties of the office as Acting President.
[SEC. 5.] Thereafter, when ever] the President transmits
to the [Congress] President Pro Tempore of the Senate and
the Speaker of the 'louse of Representatives his written declaration that no inability exists, he shalll resume the powers and
duties of his office unless the Vice President, [with the
written concurrence of a majority of the heads of the executive departments or such other body as Congress may by law!
provide, transmits within two days to the Congress his] and
a majority of the principal officers of the execute e departments,
or such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit
within two days to the President Pro Tempore of the Senate and
the Speaker of the Hlouse of Representatives their written
declaration that the President is unable to discharge the
of his office. Thereupon Congress shall
powers and duties
decide the issue, immediately assembling for
[immediately]
that purpose if not in session. If the Congress, within ten
(lays
after the receipt of the written declaration of the Vice
President and a majority of the principal officers of the executive departments, or such other body as Congress may by law
by two-thirds vote of both Houses that
provide, determines
the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of
the office, the Vice President shall continue to discharge the
same as Acting President; otherwise the President shall
resume the powers and duties of his office.

ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF REPRESENTATIVE
EDWARD HUTCHINSON
House Joint Resolution 1, as reported, would ratify the Tyler
of succession to the office of President by the Vice President
precedent
upon the death of the President; it would provide for filling a vacancy
in the office of Vice President; and it would incorporate into the
'Constitution a detailed procedure for the transfer of Executive power
from the President to the Vice President in times of the President's
inability to discharge the powers and duties of his office.
THE TYLER PRECEDENT

No, reasonable question any longer exists about the constitutional
succession to the office of President by the Vice President upon the
death of the President. Vice President Tyler's claim to the office
as well as its powers and duties, upon the death of President W. H.
Harrison in 1841, has without exception been asserted on every
subsequent like occasion. The country would not now accept any
different construction of the constitutional provision, nor would any
different construction be' warranted. There is no disagreement over
section 1 of House Joint Resolution 1. It makes clear that whenever
.a vacancy in the office of President occurs,' whether by removal, death
or resignation, the Vice President will assume the office as well as its
powers and duties.
FILLING A VICE-PRESIDENTIAL VACANCY

Section 2 of House Joint Resolution 1 would empower'and direct
the President to nominate a Vice President when that office is vacant,
and the citizen so noriinated would take office when confirmed by a
majority vote of both Hoi'ses of Congress,
While it is generally assumed each House would act separately,
the language employed requires a majority vote of both Houses, not
each House, to confirm. If, sometime in the future, pressure is brought
to bear for congressional 'confirmation' in joint convention, as some
proponents of this measure now advocate, the language of section
2 may be construed to require only a majority of both Houses combined, in that way diluting 'the vote of Senators. In my opinion,
this possibility would be lessened if the language directed the majority
vote in each Hoise instead of a majority vote of both Houses.
Although the section is silent on the point, it is expected that the
so long as each House acts separately, is a
majority ofvotetherequired,
votes cast in each House, a quorum being present.
majority
There is no requirement for a record vote, but one-fifth of those
present could require it. A secret ballot could not be ordered over

their objections.
Procedure for confirmation of nominations }ty the President by
both Houses is unique in oifr experience. All other appointments are
17

18

PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY

submitted only to the Senate, for advice and consent. A good case
could be made for submission of this nomination to the Senate alone.
After all, the sole constitutional duty of the Vice President remains
that of President of the Senate; and within the purview of the Constitution, the President, by nominating a Vicq President, is choosing
their Presiding Officer. Senate approval of his fiominee, as in the
case of other Presidential appointments, certainly would have been
thought sufficient in earlier periods of our history, and may be sufficient
today.
The case for Sonate' action alone also can be buttressed by an
analogy, In-those cases where a Vice President is not elected, because
of a failure of a majority of the electoral vote, the Constitution:
directs 'the Senate to elect one from the candidates who received the
two'highest numbers.
Finally, in the case for Senate confirmation alone, it iay be'observed
that our constitutional processes for the selection of our Presidents
and Vice Presidents are Federal in nature.' Presidential electors,
chosen in each State in such manner as the legislature may direct,
meet in' their respective States and there cast the votes to which their
State is entitled. The Senate, too, is a body FedliIl in nature. Each
State has an equal vote in the Senate. The Senate represents tle'
States in our legislative 'branch. It wold be wholly consistent with'
the preservation of the Federal structure' if the Senate were vested
with power either to elect'a Vice President to fill vacancy, or to
advise and consent to the nomination of the President for that purpose
Thus farin our history there has been a vacancy in the office of Vice
President during a part of 16 different terms.' One vacancy was
resignation of the Vice President. Seven died in office and
caused'by
the other eight succeeded to the Presidency upon the death of the'
President.
On those occasions when the Vice President's office becomes vacant
through removal, death, or resignation, it is possible that some division
in Congress might occur over confirmation of a President's nomination
of a successor. But onl.those occasions when a vacancy is due' to a
Vice President's succession to tihe Presidency, and the new Presidenit
so recently a Vice President himself, is called upon to noiiniate
another, the. temper of the country and of the Congress is likely to
be such as to make congressional confirmation of the appointment
pro forma. Under such circumstances, how meaningful really is the
function of congressional confirmation? The new President might
as well be empowered to appoint a new Vice President outright.
Consider the terrible pressures that will immediately come to bear.
on a newly elevated President to choose a Vice President. No time
is specified within which the nomination must be made, but it would
be a mistake to believe the new President coilld relieve the pressure
by putting the matter off. As soon as he enters tiie residential stage,
the new President will see.prospective Vice Presideits and their supporters in the wings. In addition to all of the other cares, duties,
and responsibilities thrust. upon him,he will also have to deal with
those who aspire to the second highest office of the land--the largest
within his hands.
plum
A better solution to the problem of succession to the office of Vice
President would be to provide that the holder of some other office in
a
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the administration' should automatically succeed to' the Vice;
Presidency.
It is hard enough for the country to go through the sad experience
of a change of administration at the time of the death of a President,
when the succession is automatic. That is the situation now and as
it has been. Since 1792 there has always been a known successor to
the office of President when there was no Vice President. But upon
the ratification of this proposed amendment, there will be. an air of
Prsident
a'tlehst for the time during-'which it takes a newly
uncertainty,
to nominate and obtain confirmation of his choice-and this uhcertainty will be experienced at a time when the country can least bear it.
PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY

House Joint Resolution 1 would incorporate into the Constitution
detailed procedure for the transfer, of Executive power from. the
President. to the Vice President in times of the President's inability to
the powers and duties of his office. Such .transfer can occur
discharge
with' the President's consent or over his protest. The language of the
resolution offers no hint .that the determination of inabilty shall be
based on medical or psychiatric evidence. Instead, the determination
will be apolitical one; and herelies'a danger, in the;proposal.
Words written into the Constitution in the past are now found to
have vested powers to extents and in ways pot intended hy their
authors. We should. be extremely careful, lest we unwittingly provide tools of power we would ourselves oppose.
Do the provisions :of section 4 of this resolution in effect create'a
new way in which a President might be removed from office? Might
it be possible for a Vice President, sometime in the future, to form a
cabal with a majority of the President's Cabinet and size power.from
him?. Are we, by incorporating these words. into the Constitution,
machinery by which the stability of the office of Presiproviding;the
dent might be undermined? All it takes, under section 4, is for the
Vice President and a majority of the Cabinet to file their written
declaration of the President's inability with the President pro. tempore
of the Senate 'and the Speaker of the House, and theVice President
becomes Acting President.: Then the President, dislodged by this
a

maneuver from his awesome powers, is put in the position of having
to in' back his position by persuading Conigress of his' fitness:. Here
again the decision will be a political one. There is no suggestion that
medical or psychiatric evidence even be considered. And, if an
President should fail to find support among at least a
unpopular
Senators and Representatives in Congress, he would
of
the
third
continue in name only, shorn of his powers and duties. He could
apparently make repeated attempts to regain the powers of his office
until his term expires. Would these circumstance lend stability to
the:country. or undermine it?
On the other hand, suppose an unpopular President is upheld by the
with more than one-third, but less than a majority of the
Congress
Members sustaining his contention of ability to serve. Is it not
possible the same cabal might try again? The President would
break it up, if possible, by changes in his Cabinet, providing he could
win the advice and consent of' the Senate for his new appointees, b.ut
under such circumstances he might not obtain confirmation of his
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Cabinet changes. Would these circumstances tend to lend stability
to the Government or undermine it?
Other assumptions might be made to illustrate further how the
we now offer the country might sometime be used by men
machinery
ambitious for power.
We should keep in mind that we are fashioning tools which could
be used to unsettle the stability of our Government while we mean to
it.
promote
Section:4,is certainly not intended, to provide the tools for power to
evil men. Its drafters had in mind an altogether different situation.
suppose an ill President, physically unable to give his consent for
They
the assumption of power by the Vice President. Under these circumstances some alternative to his consent must be devised if the Government is to carry on. Thereafter, when the President has recovered
to resume his duties, or thinks he has, the drafters wanted
sufficiently
to be sure of machinery whereby;he could recover his powers from a
Vice President and Cabinet who might disagree with his own assessment of recovery.
Supporters of this proposal call the power of public opinion to their
defense and say a Vice President and Cabinet, would not dare seize
from a President physically and mentally able, nor withhold
power from
him once'recovered. But public opinion can be molded,
power
and some Presidents in our history have been most unpopular in
and probably there will ,be some in the future.
office,
There is no definition of inability or disability in the proposed
amendment, nor is thereuncertainty
any provision for the definition of this term.
of congressional power to define
If there has existed an
it under existing constitutional provisions, it is clear Congress will be
without power to define an inability after House Joint Resolution 1
is incorporated into the Constitution.
The proposal will leave to the President in section 3; and to the
Vice President and Cabinet majority in section 4, complete power to
treat any condition. or circumstance they choose as a disability. It is
even conceivable, though I hope not likely, that some President might
declare himself unable, and state no reason therefore (since no reason is
in order to avoid responsibility for some
required by the language) the
powers of his office upon the Vice
unpopular.foract, devolving
-the time. ibeini to accomplish that purpose. After
Present
ratification of House Joint Resolution 1, the Congress definitely
cannot define by law what constitutes Presidential disability. I think
a good case can be made to vest that power of definition in Congress.
Here would be another check and balance in our system, built in to
guard
against abuse of power.
It was suggested in the hearings that the President might declare
his inability because of absence from the country. It seems unlikely
that he would do so because he would want to go abroad with full
powers of his office, as Presidents have (lone in the past. But members
should know that in theminds of some, the languageof this proposal
of the burdens of his
will permit a future President to relieve
-hiimself
to
absence.
of
due
inability
office, at will, by a declaration
1
leave
The provisions of House Joint Resolution
many questions
unresolved. For example, it does not address itself to the problem of
what happens if an Acting President suffers an inability. It overlooks
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the possibility of a Presidential inability at a time when there is no
Vice President, which might occur soon after a new President'succedede
to office and before he nominated a new Vice President. How could
the machinery of section 4 work then? Under the language of that
it would appear essential that there be a Vice President to
section, the
trigger machinery of that section
In my opinion it would be better to work out the answers to these
problems and others before submitting this proposed amendment for
ratification. There is no real urgency. We now have a Vice President,
and an executive understandii'g between him'and th'e Pres.ideit on the
matter of Presidential disability. We should not rush this proposal
on its way until it is as perfect as we can make it. These other
remain unsolved and those who are concerned about a
problems will
of
and ability will continue to press for further
succession
certainty
amendments.
It will be tragic if we have unwittingly deprived Congress of power
to move into any breach in the structure here being fashioned.
Respectfully submitted.
EDWARD HTTCHINSON.

DISSENTING VIEWS OF REPRESENTATIVE CHARLES McC.
MATHIAS, JR.
I dissentrfrom the views of the majority of the comriittee with
to the grant of power to the President to nominate his heir. I
respect such
as being in conflict with the basic principles of the
oppose andpower
the philosophy of the Constitution which tends to disRepublic
rather than to centralize, power.
perse,
The Presidency has always been considered an elective office, but it
will not be purely elective if this amendment is adopted.
.The Constitutional Convention, as we know it through Madison's
Journal, would
surely have rejected an appointed Vice President on
grounds of principle alone. Modern conditions, while compelling,
do not dictate that we abandone principle when we provide a modern
method of succession.
The Copstitution seeks means to interpose legal safeguards between
the weakness, the temptations, and the evil of men and the opportunity
to injure the state. We do the same in private life when we ask an
honest debtor to execute a mortgage or an honorable man to state his
in writing.
promise or covenant
the
President
to name a Vice President, House Joint
By permitting
Resolution 1 operates on the opposite principle, assuming that a
President will always be enlightened and disinterested in naming a
Vice President. While this optimism reflects well on the 20th Century's opinion of itself in contrast to the pragmatic 18th century
estimate of human frailty, it may not be a prudent basis for constitutional law.
confirmation of a vice-presidential nominee would be
Congressional
check
a
mild
and, in my judgment, would be a mere formality
only
in a period of national emotional stress. Most of us who were here
in the last dark days of November 1963 would confirm that almost
any such request made by President Johnson would have been favorably received by the Congress in our desire to support and stabilize his
administration.
Giving the:President exclusive power to nominate a Vice President
has been justified by a false analogy to the broad discretion allowed
modern presidential nominees to express a preference for their running
mates. But a presidential nominee and an incumbent President are
very different mnen-even if they inhabit the same mortal frame-and
by very different motives. A President secure
they White moved,
in themay::be
House will have undergone a metamorphosis from his
earlier self, insecurely and temporarily occupying the presidential
suite at the Blackstone or the Mark Hopkins during the climax of a
national convention.
If the presidential nominee really is allowed a personal choice of
he will seek a candidate to complement his own candirunningandmates,
to strengthen the ticket. He will want an attractive,
dacy
vigorous, and patently able associate. The electability of the vice22
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candidate is a form of accountability for the head of the
presidential
ticket. By way of example, recall the probable motives of Senator
John F. Kennedy in choosing Lyndon B. Johnson for his running
mate and consider whether the same motives would have been decisive
PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY

with President John F. Kennedy.
Furthermore, the analogy used to justify this amendment would
political custom into organic law. Current
crystallizeat contemporary
national political conventions and conventions themselves
practice
are the creatures of custom only. Customs can and should change as
technological changes affect our way of living.
social, political and
The Constitution cannot and should not be so flexible.
The public today is all too ready to impugn the motives of a
President dealing with his Vice President. It is hinted that a President is constantly tempted to relegate the Vice President to a subordinate role in political life. If such motives are credible in daily
relations, how much more would they be present in the
governmental
an
of
heir end successor.
selection
to the provisions of House Joint Resoluconsideration
Couple this
to
Presidential
and the considerations
tion 1 with respect
inability
a
to
nominate
President
move
a
that might
respectable, but pallid,
Vice President. If the heir apparent is to gain certain powers of
as well as natural succession, a President may indeed hesideposition
in
tate
seeking a vigorous and aggressive Vice President. Such a
danger would not have escaped examination by the framers of the
Constitution and should be considered by those who propose to
amend it.
CHARLES McC. MATHIAS, Jr.
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